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5.1 A Bertrand game between settlementAbstract
Exchanges and other trading platforms are often vertically integrated to carry out trad-
ing, clearing and settlement as one operation. We show that such vertical silos can
prevent eﬃciency gains from horizontal consolidation of trading and settlement plat-
forms to be realized. Independent of the gains from such consolidation, when costs of
settlement are private information, there is no mechanism that achieves the merger of
the vertical silos in a way that trading and settlement are produced eﬃciently after
the merger. Furthermore, we show that such an ex-post eﬃcient merger can always be
implemented by delegating the operation of settlement platforms to agents.
Keywords: Clearing and Settlement; Mechanism Design; Horizontal and Vertical Integration
JEL Classiﬁcations: C73, G20, G34, L22
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Clearing and settlement systems have as of lately received a lot of attention in the context of 
financial integration of the euro area.  The Giovannini Reports (2001) and (2003) discovered 
sizeable transaction costs and risks in the current clearing and settlement infrastructure that 
prevent efficient cross-border trading within Europe.  It is therefore argued that the 
consolidation of this infrastructure is the key element for realizing large efficiency gains 
inherent in financial markets integration. 
 
We demonstrate in this paper, however, that such a consolidation does not necessarily lead to 
an efficient financial market organization.  In particular, we find that it is impossible to reap 
the full gains of horizontal consolidation if trading, clearing and settlement take place in 
vertically integrated firms and costs for clearing and settlement are private information.   
Furthermore, we show that breaking up these vertical silos and inducing competition in the 
areas of clearing and settlement can realize all efficiency gains from consolidation. 
 
Our model considers two players each operating a vertically integrated firm.  These firms 
offer trading as well as clearing and settlement of trades. They contemplate a consolidation of 
their trading and settlement activities, according to which they would pool their technology.  
We call such consolidation a merger.  A merger between the firms is beneficial since it 
increases overall profits due to two reasons.  First, we assume that the merger increases the 
joint demand for trading of the two firms and, hence, generates higher joint revenue.  Second, 
the costs for settling trades can be different across firms.  Hence, a merged firm can settle 
trades at the lower cost of the two firms.  We assume that the costs for settling trades are 
private information of the players. 
 
Using methods from mechanism design we show that there is no mechanism that allows the 
players to merge the vertically integrated firms in a way that trading and settlement are 
produced efficiently after the merger.  Interestingly, this is independent of the overall gains in 
revenue that are obtained from increasing overall demand for the merged firms.  It is 
important to emphasize that this result is not about the possibility of a merger per se, but 
about achieving an efficient merger, i.e. a merger that realizes all possible benefits associated 
with the merger. 
 
We offer two ways to overcome the problems inherent in the vertically integrated structure.  
First, if a subsidy is available to vary the overall gains from merging, the incentives to reveal 
the costs can be restored.  Provided the gains arising from additional demand are large, the 
required subsidy can even be negative which is equivalent to taxing the merger. 
 
The second way is a market solution and is based on vertical disintegration.  Here each player 
delegates the operation of his settlement platform to an agent which we assume to be an 
insider, i.e., we assume that the agent can observe the true cost of settlement.  The players 
give then their agents an incentive to offer settlement of trades competitively.  This can be 
achieved by splitting the profits from settlement between the firm and the agent.  Since 
competition between the two agents reveals the true costs, the two firms can then merge their 
trading operations and settle all trades with the agent that offers the lowest price for 
settlement.  This corresponds to the efficient solution where the trading of the two firms is 
merged, while all trades get settled at the lowest cost. 
 
The recent experience of consolidation among European stock exchanges supports our 
findings.  The case of Euronext, a merger between the Paris, Bruxelles and Amsterdam stock 
exchanges, was accompanied with the vertical disintegration of these exchanges which were 
originally set up as vertical structures.  A similar project, the iX trading platform between 
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Non-technical summaryLondon Stock Exchange and the Deutsche Börse in Frankfurt, failed however.  Interestingly, 
Deutsche Börse pursued the creation of a vertical silo in parallel to the planned merger.  In a 
case study, we describe these recent experiences in more detail and provide evidence that 
vertical structures such as Deutsche Börse formed an impediment to efficient market 
consolidation in the Euro-area. 
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Clearing and settlement systems have as of lately received a lot of attention in the context of
ﬁnancial integration of the euro area. The Giovannini Reports (2001) and (2003) discovered
sizeable transaction costs and risks in the current clearing and settlement infrastructure that
prevent eﬃcient cross-border trading within Europe. It is therefore argued that the consoli-
dation of this infrastructure is the key element for realizing large eﬃciency gains inherent in
ﬁnancial markets integration.1
We demonstrate in this paper, however, that such a consolidation does not necessarily lead
to an eﬃcient ﬁnancial market organization. In particular, we ﬁnd that it is impossible to
reap the full gains of horizontal consolidation if trading, clearing and settlement take place
in vertically integrated ﬁrms and costs for clearing and settlement are private information.
Furthermore, we show that breaking up these vertical silos and inducing competition in the
areas of clearing and settlement can realize all eﬃciency gains from consolidation.
Our model considers two players each operating a vertically integrated ﬁrm. These ﬁrms oﬀer
trading as well as clearing and settlement of trades. They contemplate a consolidation of their
trading and settlement activities, according to which they would pool their technology. We
call such consolidation a merger. A merger between the ﬁrms is beneﬁcial since it increases
overall proﬁts due to two reasons. First, we assume that the merger increases the joint
demand for trading of the two ﬁrms and, hence, generates higher joint revenue. Second, the
costs for settling trades can be diﬀerent across ﬁrms. Hence, a merged ﬁrm can settle trades
at the lower cost of the two ﬁrms. We assume that the costs for settling trades are private
information of the players.
Using methods from mechanism design we show that there is no mechanism that allows the
players to merge the vertically integrated ﬁrms in a way that trading and settlement are
produced eﬃciently after the merger. Interestingly, this is independent of the overall gains
in revenue that are obtained from increasing overall demand for the merged ﬁrms. It is
1See also Green (2001) who assesses the importance of clearing and settlement structures for the develop-
ment of ﬁnancial markets.
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about achieving an eﬃcient merger, i.e. a merger that realizes all possible beneﬁts associated
with the merger.
The reason for this result is as follows. A merger has to specify how the overall joint revenue
is shared between the players and which of the two ﬁrms provides the settlement of trades
after the merger. For the merger to be eﬃcient, the players have to ensure that the lowest cost
ﬁrm will carry out settlement. Since the costs for settlement are private information, truthful
revelation of the costs implies that the share of revenue a player obtains varies with the costs
announced by a player. However the total post-merger revenue net of production cost is
constant. Therefore, it is infeasible to give proper incentive to two players simultaneously,
since what is granted to one cannot be granted to the other and vice versa.
We oﬀer two ways to overcome the problems inherent in the vertically integrated structure.
First, if a subsidy is available to vary the overall gains from merging, the incentives to reveal
the costs can be restored. Provided the gains arising from additional demand are large, the
required subsidy can even be negative which is equivalent to taxing the merger.
The second way is a market solution and is based on vertical disintegration. Here each player
delegates the operation of his settlement platform to an agent which we assume to be an
insider, i.e., we assume that the agent can observe the true cost of settlement. The players
give then their agents an incentive to oﬀer settlement of trades competitively. This can
be achieved by splitting the proﬁts from settlement between the ﬁrm and the agent. Since
competition between the two agents reveals the true costs, the two ﬁrms can then merge
their trading operations and settle all trades with the agent that oﬀers the lowest price for
settlement. This corresponds to the eﬃcient solution where the trading of the two ﬁrms is
merged, while all trades get settled at the lowest cost.
The recent experience of consolidation among European stock exchanges supports our ﬁnd-
ings. The case of Euronext, a merger between the Paris, Bruxelles and Amsterdam stock
exchanges, was accompanied with the vertical disintegration of these exchanges which origi-
nally were set up as vertical structures. A similar project, the iX trading platform between
London Stock Exchange and the Deutsche B¨ orse in Frankfurt, failed however. Interestingly,
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low we describe these recent experiences in more detail and provide evidence that vertical
structures such as Deutsche B¨ orse formed an impediment to eﬃcient market consolidation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We start our analysis in Section 2 with
a detailed case study of the Euronext and the planned iX merger. Section 3 outlines our
model. We derive the impossibility result of achieving an ex-post eﬃcient merger in Section
4. We then describe how a subsidy (or a tax) can restore eﬃciency. Section 5 demonstrates
that vertical delegation can solve the problem of implementing mergers eﬃciently. The last
section concludes.
2 Securities Settlement Systems and the Consolidation
of Securities Markets
2.1 Securities Market Organization - A Brief Overview
Transacting securities involves other actions than simply trading, i.e., buying and selling a
security. For clarity and to demonstrate their importance, we brieﬂy review the so-called back
oﬃce services that are necessary to eﬀect a trade in securities market.
There are two diﬀerent operations that complete a trade of a security. The ﬁrst one, clearing
the trade, conﬁrms the legal obligations from the trade. Clearing involves (among possible
other services) transmitting and reconciling the terms of a securities’ trade between the buyer
and seller. In some cases this is taken on by a special entity, a clearing house, that can also
function as what is called a Central Counterparty or CCP. This entity interposes itself as the
buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer of a security.
Following the clearing stage the second operation is settling a trade. This involves the actual
transfer of ownership from the seller to the buyer as well as the payment for the security by
the buyer thereby discharging the legal obligations from the trade. This operation is often
handled by a so-called Central Security Depository (or CSD) that holds the security and
9
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cleared.
Stock exchanges and other trading platforms often operate in vertical silos oﬀering a one-stop
service to traders. This service ranges from executing a trade over clearing the transaction to
settling it by transferring the title of the security and the payment between the parties of the
trade. In these vertical silos, the stock exchange either directly owns or controls the clearing
house and/or the CSD that are responsible for clearing and settling the trades.
2.2 Securities Market Consolidation in Europe - A Case Study
The introduction of a single currency for the euro area from 1998 onwards prompted a process
of consolidation within the infrastructure of European securities markets. We give here a brief
overview over this process. Our goal is to demonstrate that questions regarding the ownership
and structure of clearing and settlement arrangements decisively shaped this process.
There are two recent examples from the European experience that indicate why some con-
solidation was successful, while other developments are still unresolved. The ﬁrst one is the
successful merger between the Amsterdam, Bruxelles and Paris stock exchanges labelled Eu-
ronext. The second one is the failed creation of iX, a merger of Deutsche B¨ orse (DB) and
the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In both cases it is striking that settlement arrangements
played seemingly an important - if not decisive - role for the outcome of the merger.
As early as 1998, the LSE and DB expressed their intention to form a joint trading platform
called iX to consolidate the nationally orientated exchanges. Spurred by the promise of
huge cost savings2 the move gathered momentum quickly with six other European exchanges
(Amsterdam, Bruxelles, Madrid, Milan, Paris, Swiss) joining the plan until May, 1999. During
the merger talks between the exchanges, a parallel process was initiated in the area of back
oﬃce operations. CEDEL, an internationally operating settlement agent merged with DB
Clearing in July 1999 to form Clearstream. Shortly after, DB bought a controlling stake
2The LSE for example estimates the total cost savings from consolidation of clearing and settlement in
Europe to be around 1.6bn Euro per year (LSE (2002)).
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This move coincides with a reorientation of some other stock exchanges. First, Euronext
was launched in March 2000, when Sicovam, the CSD of the Paris stock exchange, broke
oﬀ merger talks with Clearstream. Shortly afterwards, the iX merger failed seemingly over
problems with ﬁnding the right arrangement on the settlement layer. The Financial Times
reported in their July, 20th 2000 edition that
“Clearstream and Crest [the settlement agent for London’s securities markets]
would make an announcement at the end of August on what clearing and set-
tlement service they intended to oﬀer to users of ... iX. Shareholders of the two
exchanges are already agitating for answers to that essential question. It seems
likely that the solution to be oﬀered will be interim. Such a step would be unlikely
to oﬀer the cost savings that iX is promising,...”
While the iX merger failed, the Euronext merger was completed by September 2000. The
key step was to consolidate clearing and settlement in an independent entity. This was
achieved through incorporating the French, Dutch and Belgian CSDs into Euroclear, the
second major international settlement agent. Euronext has expanded recently to include the
Lisbon exchange as well as the LIFFE, a London based future and derivatives exchange. Both
these acquisitions were accompanied by the merger of the settlement agents, Interbolsa and
Crest, with Euroclear. Finally, in June 2003, the clearing arrangements for Euronext were
consolidated by merging Clearnet, the former French CPP, with its London counterpart, the
London Clearing House (LCH).
Looking back at this experience one is struck by the evidence that the success for consolidation
rested upon ﬁnding a solution for merging not only trading, but also settlement and clearing
arrangements.3 DB’s strategy of erecting a vertical silo seemed to be the main reason that
3As the Financial Times noted on July, 14th 2000, “...[The] integration of Euronext for trading, settlement
and clearing will probably be faster and easier to achieve than for the proposed iX merger...[which] still has
to decide whether ... it will rely on Crest ... or Clearstream to settle equities. ... experts question whether
this is feasible in practice.” On October 25th, 1999 it was stated that “At the heart of the problem has been
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disagreement between London and Frankfurt over which electronic trading platform and which clearing and
settlement system to choose.”prevented a potential merger to realize eﬃciency gains between LSE and DB. This is backed
best by a recent statement issued by the LSE (LSE (2002)).
“...[The] optimal solution is to create a single system ... that is run as a ‘utility’
and is independent of exchanges and other trading platforms. (p.8) ... Action
is required to impose the separation of trading platforms and clearing and set-
tlement activities. Vertical silos, especially if run as for-proﬁt businesses, have
perverse incentives ... to prevent interoperability and further consolidation at the
clearing and settlement level. Breaking up these silos and separating trading plat-
forms from clearing and settlement systems is a vital preliminary step towards
establishing an eﬃcient market structure. (p.21)”
Why was the Euronext merger then successful? The answer seems again to be buried in
the back oﬃce structures. Euroclear was an independent entity from the start. After the
acquisition of Clearstream by DB, it was the natural catalyst for moving from vertical to
horizontal integration for the Euronext project. The vertical silo structure of DB to the
contrary was a clear disadvantage in leading a consolidation process. As Pierre Francotte,
CEO of Euroclear, expressed it when defending the company’s approach,
“Euroclear believes that horizontal integration, with users rather than stock ex-
changes owning and governing the settlement service providers, is the best way of
achieving the market’s objectives of lower transaction costs and higher eﬃciency.
However, until such time that a pan-European settlement solution is in place, it is
essential for users to have a choice of settlement location for their trade. ... The
vertical silo approach - where stock exchanges own and govern their clearing and
settlement houses - makes settlement location more diﬃcult to achieve. Which
stock exchange or CCP will want to feed business and revenues to a settlement
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ing it. First, major gains from horizontal consolidation of security markets arise in form
of cost savings in the area of back oﬃce operations. Second, ownership of settlement and
clearing operations by exchanges can be an impediment to realize these gains. Third, break-
ing up vertically integrated exchanges can be a way to capture the gains from horizontal
consolidation.
3 Environment
We conﬁrm our assessment now by analyzing a simple model that investigates whether ver-
tically integrated ﬁrms can capture all gains from horizontal consolidation. We consider an
economy with two ﬁrms, i = 1,2, owned by player i. Each ﬁrm produces a service, which
encompasses production of a ﬁnal product (here carrying out a trade on a stock exchange) and
distributing the product (here clearing and settling a trade). The cost for a ﬁrm of running
the trading platform is normalized to 0 while the cost of running the settlement platform is
θi, distributed according to a common density function f with support [0,1]. We assume that
θi is private information of player i.
Each ﬁrm is assumed to be initially vertically integrated. If a trade takes place on platform i,
it has to be settled on platform i. For simplicity, we assume that each ﬁrm faces a demand Di
taking the following form: Di = 1 if pi ≤ ¯ p and zero otherwise. Hence, there is no substitution
between the products of the two ﬁrms and the demand is inelastic up to price ¯ p. The proﬁt
of player i from operating the ﬁrm is ˜ Πi(θi) = ¯ p−θi. Note that the price does not reveal the
cost of settlement. Hence, player j cannot observe the cost θi from the price ﬁrm j quotes for
trading plus settlement. We assume that ¯ p > 1.4
If the two ﬁrms merge, they can realize an additional demand equal to d ≥ 0. Total demand
for the merged ﬁrms is then given by 2 + d if p ≤ ¯ p and 0 otherwise. Hence, there are two
potential gains from merging. First, the players could merge the ﬁrms and realize the extra
4This assumption can be interpreted as the ﬁrms operating in segmented markets oﬀering a single, indi-
visible good. We discuss this assumption in more detail in the last section of the paper.
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for all the demand at lower cost. Thus, if the costs were common knowledge, then ﬁrm 1
and 2 would merge, satisfy the joint demand of 2 + d at a price p = ¯ p, produce settlement
at min{θi,θj} and realize in all cases a joint proﬁt that is larger than the sum of individual
proﬁts. Costs θi are private information, however, and can not be discovered by merging the
two ﬁrms. This means that the costs do not become common knowledge for the players after
a merger between the ﬁrms is completed.5
4 Impossibility of Ex-Post Eﬃcient Mergers
The beneﬁts from merging can only be exploited if settlement costs are known. In this
section we show that private information on the costs of settlement renders an eﬃcient merger
impossible independent of d. For an eﬃcient merger the additional beneﬁts arise in part from
the use of the most eﬃcient settlement system. These beneﬁts have to be shared among the
two ﬁrms with the size of the beneﬁts depending on the diﬀerence of settlement costs between
the two ﬁrms. With θi being private information, how these proﬁts are shared can, however,
only depend on the costs the ﬁrms announce. Hence, a ﬁrm can inﬂuence its share of the
proﬁt through its announcement of costs. Unless the sharing rule can elicit truthful revelation
of costs, an eﬃcient merger is then not possible.
Using ideas from mechanism design we ask whether there exists a mechanism that can im-
plement the use of the most eﬃcient settlement platform after the merger between the ﬁrms
has taken place. Invoking the revelation principle, we restrict ourselves to studying direct
mechanisms where ﬁrms only make a cost announcement. A direct mechanism is a function
M = (t,y) that speciﬁes for each announcement θ = (θ1,θ2) a transfer rule t(θ) = (t1(θ),t2(θ))
and an allocation rule y(θ) = (y1(θ),y2(θ)) of settlement operations. Given θ, the payoﬀ for
each player is then given by Πi(t,y|θ) = ti(θ) − (2 + d)yi(θ)θi. We deﬁne further that a
mechanism is Bayesian incentive-compatible if for each i,j such that θi is the true type of i
5The often intricate nature of settlement and clearing procedures make it diﬃcult to identify the true costs
of any particular arrangement (see for example Giovannini (2001) and (2003)).
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i,θj)θidF(θj) for all θ
0
i. (4.1)
Next, a mechanism is feasible if, ﬁrst, it is individually rational, i.e., the expected proﬁt for
each player from merging is at least as high as the proﬁt from not merging,
Z
Πi(t,y|θi,θj)f(θj)dθj ≥ ˜ Πi(θi), (4.2)
second, the whole return from the merged ﬁrms are distributed between the players
t1(θ) + t2(θ) = (2 + d)¯ p, (4.3)
third, transfers are feasible, i.e., positive,
ti(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ, (4.4)
since we assume that the players do not have initial wealth6 and
2 X
i=1
yi(θ) = 1 for all θ, (4.5)
where yi(θ) ≥ 0 for all i.
Finally, an allocation is ex-post eﬃcient if the settlement platform with the lowest cost carries
out settlement, i.e.,
yi(θ) = 1 if θi ≤ θj and 0 otherwise. (4.6)
In the sequel we will abuse language slightly by using ‘ex-post eﬃcient merger’ instead of
‘ex-post eﬃcient allocation’ of settlement activities. We then have the following impossibility
result which is an application of a result due to Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
Theorem 1. There is no incentive-compatible and feasible mechanism that implements an
ex-post eﬃcient merger between the two ﬁrms.
6Note, however, from the deﬁnition of Πi that the players’ payoﬀs can be negative.
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y is ex-post eﬃcient. Deﬁne the expected payoﬀ of type θi from taking part in the mecha-
nism given type j reveals his type truthfully as ¯ Πi(t,y|θi) =
R
Πi(t,y|θi,θj)f(θj)dθj. Also
deﬁne the expected probability to produce of a type θi given j reveals his type truth-
fully as ¯ yi(θi) =
R
yi(θi,θj)f(θj)dθj. Similarly, deﬁne the expected transfer to a type θi
as ¯ ti(θi) =
R
ti(θi,θj)f(θj)dθj. From the incentive compatibility constraint (4.1) we have for
all θi and θ0
i
¯ Πi(t,y|θi) = ¯ ti(θi) − (2 + d)¯ yi(θi)θi ≥ ¯ ti(θ
0





i) = ¯ ti(θ
0








(2 + d)¯ yi(θi)(θ
0
i − θi) ≥ ¯ Πi(t,y|θi) − ¯ Πi(t,y|θ
0





which shows that ¯ yi(θi) is non-increasing. Setting θ0




= −(2 + d)¯ yi(θi).
Hence we have that ¯ Πi(t,y|θi) = ¯ Πi(t,y|si) −
R θi
si (2 + d)¯ y(vi)dvi.



















+ (2 + d)¯ yi(θi)θi

f(θi)dθi














where Ψ(θi,si) = θi −
1−F(θi)
f(θi) if si < θi and θi +
F(θi)
f(θi) if si > θi.
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(1 − F(θi))F(θi)dθi −
Z 1
si





¯ ti(θi)f(θi)dθi + (2 + d)
Z 1
0
¯ yi(θi)θif(θi)dθi − [E(θi|θi ≤ si) + si(1 − F(si))]

.
Hence, the expected payoﬀ of type si is equal to the average pay-oﬀ for player i plus the
surplus his information creates.
Now, let si = 0 for all i. That is we consider the type of ﬁrms that have the least beneﬁt
from merging as they are the most eﬃcient. Total transfers are then given by
Z











From feasibility we have t1(θ) + t2(θ) = (2 + d)¯ p for all θ so that
Z
t1(θ) + t2(θ)f(θ)dθ = (2 + d)¯ p.
This implies that





= (2 + d)¯ p.
Since both ﬁrms have zero cost, the expected proﬁt from an ex-post eﬃcient merger to be
shared is the full return (2 + d)¯ p. Therefore, when both ﬁrms have zero cost it must be that
¯ Π1(t,y|0) + ¯ Π2(t,y|0) = (2 + d)¯ p. This gives a contradiction since ¯ Π1(t,y|0) + ¯ Π2(t,y|0) =




> (2 + d)¯ p.
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ﬁrms because the incentives of misrepresenting their own costs are too strong. The intuition
of the result is simple. A feasible mechanism that implements an ex-post eﬃcient merger must
specify a transfer that will redistribute the overall proﬁt from production while ensuring that
the lowest cost producer will carry out production. Eliciting truth-telling is however costly.
For instance, a low cost ﬁrm, has an incentive to announce higher than its true costs. In doing
so, it is still likely to produce and, by pretending that costs are higher, it causes total proﬁts
from the cost savings to appear lower than they are. This diﬀerence between apparent proﬁts
and true proﬁts fully accrues to the producing ﬁrm. Hence misrepresenting costs aﬀects the
transfers, but also the remaining proﬁt that a ﬁrm can keep for itself.
Our assumption on limited liability implies that truth-telling can only be elicited using the
revenue from the merger (2 + d)¯ p. This is independent of costs. Hence, what is promised to
one ﬁrm to elicit truthful revelation is not available to set up the incentives of the other ﬁrm
right. As a consequence, for certain combinations of costs, the total revenue from the merger
may not be enough to elicit truth-telling for both ﬁrms. In other words, as the mechanism
has to distribute all the revenue between the two ﬁrms, it is impossible to design transfers
that distribute all the revenue while giving both ﬁrms appropriate incentives to truthfully
reveal their costs.
An interesting property is that the impossibility result does not depend on the magnitude of
the additional demand d. The reason is that d is known by both ﬁrms and is not aﬀected
by the true costs of the producing ﬁrm. Since the total revenue from merging including the
additional revenue ¯ pd must be split between the two ﬁrms, transfers always have to include
all revenue. As ﬁrms are risk neutral, the severity of the incentive problem is unaﬀected by
the magnitude of d. Hence, the costs of eliciting the truth is independent of d. Therefore, the
eﬃcient merger is as diﬃcult to implement when d > 0 as when d = 0.
From the proof of Theorem 1, we can infer, however, that a subsidy can implement a merger
ex-post eﬃciently. Since a subsidy can depend on the ﬁrms’ announcements, the revenue
from the merger plus the subsidy can vary with the announced costs. Whenever the subsidy
is decreasing with the cost one can counteract the incentive to report a high cost in order to
18
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ﬁrms, a subsidy will enable the ﬁrms to overcome the informational problem. This is what
we show in the next result, where we assume for simplicity that f is the uniform distribution
on [0,1].
Theorem 2. There exists a subsidy schedule si(θ) for all θ and all i, such that an ex-post
eﬃcient merger is implementable. Furthermore, there exists d∗(¯ p) > 0 such that, for d >
d∗(¯ p), an ex-post eﬃcient merger can be implemented with si(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ and all i.
Finally, d∗(¯ p) → ∞ as ¯ p → 1.
Proof. We now set the transfers to be ti(θ) = τi(θ) + si(θ), where τi(·) is the sharing rule
of the return from the merger and si(·) is the subsidy received. Hence, ¯ τi(θi) + ¯ τj(θj) =
(2 + d)¯ p for all θi and θj. Using a standard result of implementation theory (see for example
Proposition 23.D.2 in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995)) an ex-post eﬃcient merger is
implementable if and only if, for all i
• the function (2 + d)¯ yi(θi) is non-increasing,
• ¯ Πi(t,y|θi) = ¯ Πi(t,y|0) −
R θi
0 (2 + d)¯ yi(vi)dvi for all θi ∈ [0,1] and
• ¯ Πi(t,y|θi) ≥ ¯ p − θi.
where yi(θ) is ex post eﬃcient. Since yi(θ) is ex post eﬃcient, the ﬁrst condition is clearly
fulﬁlled.
We will now derive conditions on ti(·) such that the last two conditions hold. The second
condition implies for yi(θ) being ex-post eﬃcient that ¯ Πi(t,y|θi) − ¯ Πi(t,y|0) = −(2 + d)(θi −
θ2
i/2). Furthermore, by deﬁnition of the average pay-oﬀ for type θi we have ¯ Πi(t,y|θi) =
¯ ti(θi) − θi(2 + d)(1 − θi) for all θ. Thus the second condition is equivalent to
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where ¯ si(θi) is the expected subsidy received by type θi. Using symmetry, we can then set
the subsidy equal to





and the sharing rule equal to
¯ τi(θi) =
(2 + d)¯ p
2
.
For the third condition to be fulﬁlled, we need ¯ si(0) to be large enough for all i. Indeed,
using the expressions for ¯ si(θi) and ¯ τi(θi), the individual rationality constraint of ﬁrm i can
be rewritten as













Hence, an ex-post eﬃcient merger is implementable with a schedule of transfers {t1(θ),t2(θ)}
such that ¯ ti(θi) = ¯ τi(θ)+¯ si(θ) where ¯ τi(θi) and ¯ si(θi) satisfy the expressions given above. This
proves the ﬁrst part of Theorem 2. To prove the second part, notice that so far we imposed
no restriction on the sign of ¯ si(θi). Hence, we obtain the result by setting ¯ si(0) ≤ 0 and using
the expression above to deﬁne ¯ si(θi). Since ¯ si(0) ≥
(1+d)2
2(2+d) − d
2¯ p, we must have
(1+d)2
2(2+d) − d
2¯ p ≤ 0,
where the left hand side is decreasing in d. The remainder of the result then follows.
This proof clariﬁes further the impossibility result by fully characterizing the symmetric
subsidy needed for establishing ex-post eﬃciency. To balance the incentives of obtaining a
higher share of revenue by claiming higher costs, one has to decrease payoﬀs net of settlement
costs just fast enough with the announced costs. This is best demonstrated when looking at
a negative subsidy or a tax.
Taxing the revenues after the merger reduces the total revenue available for the two players.
By decreasing the pay-oﬀs net of costs appropriately with the announced costs, players do
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at (2 + d)¯ p. There, decreasing the share for one player means increasing the share of the
other player. Hence, it is impossible to design the incentive structure simultaneously for both
players if all revenues have to be shared. In other words, with a tax (or subsidy) one can
separate the eﬀects of an announcement of one player on the other and vice versa.
Of course, when taxing the players one might violate individual rationality. Given ¯ p, this is
the case when the gains in revenue from the merger as expressed by d are suﬃciently low.
Whenever this is the case, however, a subsidy can still achieve ex-post eﬃciency, because one
can just make participation more attractive by adding a constant lump sum transfer without
aﬀecting incentives.
5 Enabling an Ex-post Eﬃcient Merger: A Market So-
lution
In this section, we explore a second way to implement an ex-post eﬃcient merger. The key
idea is here to rely on a market solution where prices fully reveal costs. Each player can
delegate settlement activities to an insider who knows the costs and competes for carrying
out settlement of all post-merger trades. If these agents have an incentive to reveal the costs
when competing for the market, eﬃcient settlement will occur.
5.1 A Bertrand game between settlement platforms
We ﬁrst study whether agents that compete for the market choose a pricing strategy that
fully reveals costs of settlement. Let pi be the price set by agent i running settlement platform
i. For later reference, we assume that agent i can retain a share αi ∈ (0,1] of proﬁts. Since
the platform with the lowest price will get all the demand for settlement, the payoﬀ of agent
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ui(pi,pj) = αi(2 + d)

     
     
(pi − θi) if pi < pj
(pi − θi)/2 if pi = pj
0 if pi > pj.
(5.1)
We consider the Bayesian Nash equilibria of a game where both agents simultaneously an-
nounce a price pi: For all θi, agent i has to choose a price pi(θi) that is a best response to the
price schedule pj(·) of agent j given the distribution of θj which we choose to be uniform for

























where P(A) denotes the probability of event A. We show next that the price schedule in
equilibrium is strictly increasing and, hence, reveals the settlement costs.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium pricing strategy pi(θi) is continuous and strictly increasing
on [0,1] for all i.
Proof. See Appendix.
Even though this result is suﬃcient to establish that the market solution reveals the costs,
we derive a closed form solution for the equilibrium pricing strategies. This will simplify
the exposition further. As pi(·) is strictly increasing, we can deﬁne φ(p) = p
−1
i (p) = θi as
the inverse function of pi(·). Since it is monotonic, φ(·) is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere.
Setting a price pi, agent i supplies the whole market if pj(θj) > p, i.e., if θj > φj(p). This
occurs with probability 1−F(φj(p)), where F is the distribution of θj. Hence, we can rewrite
agent i’s problem (5.2) as follows
max
p
(p − θi)[1 − F(φj(p))]. (5.3)
Using the fact that θi = φi(p), that F(·) is uniform and the ﬁrst order condition for the above
problem, we obtain
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φ(1) = 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given symmetry, equation (5.4) can be written as φ(p) = 1+(φ(p)−p)φ0(p) and since φ(1) = 1
we obtain that the unique solution to this diﬀerential equation is φ(p) = 2p − 1. Hence, the
best response function for all agents satisﬁes pi(θi) = (θi + 1)/2.
5.2 Implementing the market solution
We investigate whether it is optimal for the players to separate trading from settlement in
order to fully realize the gains from merging. A market mechanism speciﬁes an action set Ai for
each player i and a market outcome function. The market outcome function describes whether
a merger takes place and whether the players separate trading and settlement. Furthermore,
it speciﬁes transfers to the players, the allocation of production in terms of the prices quoted
by the agents and the proﬁt share the agents obtain. Hence, we denote the outcome function
by a quadruple (m,t,y,α)(a,p), that expresses all these variables as functions of the players’
actions a = (a1,a2) ∈ A1 × A2 and the prices p = (p1,p2) ∈ I R2
+ resulting from the Bertrand
Game between the agents.
The function m(a,p) ∈ {0,1} describes then whether players delegated the operation of the
settlement platform to agents and whether a merger takes place. We let m(a,p) = 1 express
the fact that a merger takes place and agents are hired to operate the settlement platforms.
A market outcome is feasible for m = 0 if, for all a ∈ A such that m = 0, ti(a,p) = ¯ p,
αi(a,p) = 0 and yi(a,p) = 1 for all i. Hence, if a merger does not take place, each ﬁrm settles
its own trades and transfers are given by the revenue from trading.
Note that after the merger and after splitting oﬀ the settlement platforms, total proﬁts (and,
hence, transfers) consist of the revenue from trading, (2 + d)¯ p and the proﬁts from the set-
tlement operations minus the costs from paying for settlement pi and the fees paid to the
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schedules are restricted by limited wealth, i.e.,




yi(a,p) = 1 (5.6)
and transfer schedules distribute all revenues from the merger between the players,






(1 − αi(a,p))yi(a,p)(pi − θi))]. (5.7)
Finally, we say that a market outcome is feasible if it is feasible for m = 0 and m = 1. We
then have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1. A market outcome (m,t,y,α) is strongly implementable if it is feasible and the
unique perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a market mechanism.
Note that this deﬁnition requires that the market outcome is the equilibrium outcome for
all strategies of the players that form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that is trembling-hand
perfect. Whenever the settlement systems are run separately by agents that obtain a strictly
positive share of the proﬁt (m = 1), we have shown that prices pi(θi) are strictly increasing
in θi. Hence, prices fully reveal the costs of settlement. Hence, ex-post eﬃciency requires
that yi(a,p) = 1 if and only if pi < pj. This fact allows us to implement an ex-post eﬃcient
merger for all θ.
Theorem 3. An ex-post eﬃcient merger is strongly implementable as a market outcome.
Proof. Consider the following mechanism. Deﬁne the action sets of player i to be Ai = {0,1}
for all i. If any player i chooses ai = 0, set m((0,aj),p) = 0 (i.e. no merger takes place and
no agent is hired), ti((0,aj),p) = ¯ p, yi((0,aj),p) = 1 and αi((0,aj),p) = 0. Player i’s payoﬀ
is then ¯ p − θi. We have to show that player i obtains a strictly higher pay-oﬀ from choosing
ai = 1 if the other player also chooses aj = 1.
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share of proﬁts from settlement equal to α > 0, she strictly prefers to maximize proﬁts and
quote the Bertrand equilibrium price pi which is strictly increasing in θi by Proposition 1.
Hence, we can express transfers and settlement decisions equivalently as functions of θ, where
pi =
θi+1
2 for all i. Hence, we can set yi(a,p) = 1 if and only if pi < pj.




(¯ p − θi) + ∆(θ)/2
for all i, where ∆(θ) is the total net gain from paying the agents and realizing the cost savings
given by






θi − yi(1,θ)pi + (1 − αi)[yi(1,θ)(pi − θi)












Then, independent of d, ti(1,θ) > 0 for all θ as long as α is close enough to 0, since ¯ p > 1.
Note also, that by deﬁnition of ∆(θ) all revenue is distributed among the two players. Hence,
the market mechanism we speciﬁed is feasible.
Finally, strong implementation in perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium requires strong individual
rationality. Hence, we have to verify that
Z
ti(1,θ)dθj = (1 +
d
2




dθj > (¯ p − θi)
for all θi. Since ex-post eﬃciency requires yi(1,θ) = 1 if and only if θi ≤ θj, we have
Z































for all θi. This expression is minimized for θ∗
i = (1 − α)/(2 − α). Hence, for α low enough
this expression is strictly positive for θ∗
i which concludes the proof.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If the ﬁrms decide to cast oﬀ their settlement plat-
forms and merge, the merged platform will purchase settlement as an input in its production
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truthfully reveal the costs by quoting the Bertrand price. Hence, settlement can be provided
eﬃciently at the lowest cost and total proﬁts can be shared within the merged ﬁrm through
transfers depending on the true costs.
It is crucial here that the agent has an incentive to quote the Bertrand price while the players
do not have to monitor the agent. This is achieved by giving the agent a strictly positive
share of the proﬁts. Furthermore, this also allows the players to tie their hands, i.e., they
can credibly commit not to exploit their informational advantage. Hence, by delegating the
operation of settlement platforms to agents that share the proﬁts, the players are able to
overcome the barriers that prevented the ex-post eﬃcient merger.
Finally, observe that the result is true even if there are only gains from cost savings when the
ﬁrms merge, i.e., if d = 0. Even though there are no gains in revenue if θi = θj, this event has
measure 0 for all θi ∈ [0,1]. Hence, the expected gain from merging is always strictly positive
and the agent can be promised a strictly positive share (α > 0) of proﬁts from settlement
without making an expected loss from separating trading and settlement. The agents also
will participate, since their expected payoﬀ from running the settlement platform before they
learn θi is strictly positive. This is due to the fact that the event θi = 1 has measure 0 and
serving all the market has positive probability for all θi < 1.
6 Discussion
We conclude with some ﬁnal remarks. Our mechanism to implement the merger depends
only on the fact that one can delegate a decision (here settlement at price p) to an agent.
Any other mechanism that gives the proper incentives to the agents to reveal their private
information can also achieve the merger. We choose, however, a Bertrand game between the
agents as the mechanism to show that a competitive market can just be such a mechanism.
One shortcoming of our result is that we allow the proﬁt share for agents to be arbitrarily
small, but strictly positive. If the agents had a strictly positive outside option, this would
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is large enough, an ex-post ineﬃcient merger between the platforms might be better than
merging via a market mechanism.
It is worth mentioning that our results are robust to more general speciﬁcations of demand
functions. Crucial is here that the true costs of the vertical silos is not immediately fully
revealed through the price quoted on the market. Similarly, additional costs from merging
will not change our results provided these costs are not too large relative to the expected
gains from merging.
Even though we analyze the eﬀect of private information regarding settlement costs, our
framework applies directly to a setting where only the costs for trading are private informa-
tion. The interpretation of this paper is then that vertical silos prevent the eﬃcient consol-
idation of settlement structures. The experiences of the US consolidation of the settlement
structures can be seen as evidence for this interpretation of our ﬁndings. In the 1970s, the
New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange as well as the National Association
of Securities Dealers all operated their own clearing and settlement structures for exchanges
originating from their trading platforms. In 1976, these were merged into a new company
called the National Securities Clearing Corporation. Over time, the clearance and settle-
ment operations of other regional vertical silos were separated from trading platforms and
consolidated with the NSCC.
A diﬀerent example presents the case of the Nordic exchange, Norex, which is a joint venture
of Scandinavian and Icelandic exchanges. Here, only the trading operations are merged,
whereas the settlement arrangements are separate and still owned by the respective exchanges.
Given our results, this may be interpreted as evidence that a full merger of vertical silos is
not possible due to vested interests arising precisely in the area of settlement. The merger
of trading operations nevertheless took place due to the prospect of an increase in trading
volumes.
Finally, it is interesting to speculate how our theory is related to the recent de-mutualization of
exchanges. Exchanges are now operated as proﬁt-oriented companies rather than as mutually
owned enterprizes. Hence, de-mutualization can explain the recent drive towards horizontal
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force behind horizontal mergers, we exhibit vertical integrated structures as a potentially
important barrier to this process. In future work, this could well lead to a general theory of
the boundaries of ﬁrms based on the ﬁndings established here.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:













≥ (pi(ˆ θi) − θi)P
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(pi(ˆ θi) − θi)P
 
pj(θj) = pi(ˆ θi)
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≥ (pi(ˆ θi) − θi)P
 
pj(θj) > pi(ˆ θi)

+ (pi(ˆ θi) − θi)P
 
pj(θj) ≥ pi(ˆ θi)

.
similarly we must have
(pi(ˆ θi) − ˆ θi)P
 
pj(θj) > pi(ˆ θi)

+ (pi(ˆ θi) − ˆ θi)P
 
pj(θj) ≥ pi(ˆ θi)










Subtracting the terms of the second inequality from the ones of the ﬁrst to preserve inequality,

















pj(θj) ≥ pi(ˆ θi)
i
≥ 0.
This implies pi is non-decreasing, since the inequality is only fulﬁlled if pi(ˆ θi) ≥ pi(θi).
Next, we show that the equilibrium strategy pi(θi) is continuous. Suppose not. Then, there
exists ˆ θi such that limθi↑ˆ θi pi(θi) = p0 6= p00 = limθi↓ˆ θi pi(θi). Assume that pi(ˆ θi) = p0. The
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July 2004proof for the other case is identical. Since there is no θi that sets pi ∈ (p0,p00], there does not
exist a θj that sets pj ∈ (p0,p00).
Suppose now, ˆ θi sets a price p0 + ε < p00, where ε > 0 and suﬃciently small. The additional
pay-oﬀ for ˆ θi is given by
(p
























> 0. Then, consider ˆ θi choosing p0 − δ, where δ > 0 and suﬃciently
small. The additional pay-oﬀ is then given by
(p



























0 − δ − ˆ θi)P
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p




















> 0 by assumption. Hence, for δ close to 0, ˆ θi is
better oﬀ setting p0 −δ. This implies that it was not optimal for ˆ θi to set p0 in the ﬁrst place.
A contradiction.
Finally, to show that the equilibrium strategy pi(θi) is strictly increasing, note ﬁrst that
pi(θi) ≥ θi for all θi. Otherwise, some θi would obtain a negative pay-oﬀ which he could
improve upon by setting pi(θi) = θi irrespective of players j strategy. Suppose now that pi(θi)
is constant on some interval, i.e., pi(θi) = ˜ p for θi ∈ [θi,θi], θi < θi ≤ ˜ p. Note that ˜ p > 0 since
otherwise some type in the interval will have a strictly negative pay-oﬀ. Consider any type
θj that sets his best response to pj(θj) = ˜ p > θj.
If type θj sets a price equal to ˜ p − ε > θj, where ε > 0, he obtains an additional payoﬀ equal
to



















pi(θi) ≥ ˜ p − 

> (˜ p − θj)P
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˜ p = pi(θi)

> 0, the additional payoﬀ is
strictly positive for  suﬃciently close to 0. Hence, setting pj(θj) = ˜ p can not be optimal for
θj < ˜ p given the best response pi(·) of i and we have pj(θj) < ˜ p for all θj.
If ˜ p ≥ 1, it follows that for some θi ∈ [θi,θi] it is better to set pi(θi) < max
θj
pj(θj) ≤ ˜ p for any
strategy pj(θj) ≤ ˜ p. Thus, pi(θi) = ˜ p was not optimal for some θi, a contradiction.
Let ˜ p < 1. Suppose θj = ˜ p sets a price equal to pj(˜ p) = ˜ p. Then, increasing his price by ε > 0
yields an additional pay-oﬀ equal to
εP
 







pi(θi) = ˜ p + ε

(7.1)
which is strictly positive for ε < 1 − ˜ p since there is strictly positive mass of type i above
˜ p + ε. Hence, p(˜ p) > ˜ p and for all θj < ˜ p we have p(θj) < ˜ p. Thus, pi(θi) is discontinuous at
θj = ˜ p, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Deﬁne ˜ φi(p) = φi(p) − 1 for all i. Then, equation (5.4) can be written as ˜ φj(p) =
(˜ φi(p) − p + 1)˜ φ0
j(p). The result then follows from Fudenberg-Tirole (1991), p. 225.
30
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 375
July 2004References
The Giovannini Group (2001), “Cross-border Clearing and Settlement Arrangements in
the European Union”, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy ﬁnance/
publications/giovannini/clearing1101 en.pdf.
The Giovannini Group (2003), “Second Report on EU Clearing and Settlement Arrange-
ments”, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy ﬁnance/publications/giovannini/
clearing settlement arrangements140403.pdf.
Green, E. (2001), “Clearing and Settling Financial Transactions, Circa 2000”, in: Challenges
for Central Banking, A. Santomero, S. Viotti and A. Vredin (eds.), Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Boston.
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1991), Game Theory, MIT Press.
London Stock Exchange (2002), Response to the European Commission Communication
Dated 28 May 2002 on Clearing and Settlement.
Mas-Colell, A., Whinston M. and Green, J. (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford
University Press.
Myerson, R.B. and Satterthwaite, M.A. (1983), “Eﬃcient Mechanisms for Bilateral
Trading”, Journal of Economic Theory, 28, pp.265-281.
31
ECB
















327“Diversification in euro area stock markets: country versus industry” by G. A. Moerman, April 2004.
328“Non-fundamental exchange rate volatility and welfare” by R. Straub and I. Tchakarov, April 2004.
329“On the determinants of euro area FDI to the United States: the knowledge-capital-Tobin's Q framework,
by R. A. De Santis, R. Anderton and A. Hijzen, April 2004.
330“The demand for euro area currencies: past, present and future” by B. Fischer, P. Köhler and F. Seitz, April 2004.
331“How frequently do prices change? evidence based on the micro data underlying the Belgian CPI” by
 L. Aucremanne and E. Dhyne, April 2004.
332“Stylised features of price setting behaviour in Portugal: 1992-2001” by M. Dias, D. Dias 
and P. D. Neves, April 2004.
333“The pricing behaviour of Italian firms: New survey evidence on price stickiness” by
 S. Fabiani, A. Gattulli and R. Sabbatini, April 2004.
334“Is inflation persistence intrinsic in industrial economies?” by A. T. Levin and J. M. Piger, April 2004.
335“Has eura-area inflation persistence changed over time?” by G. O’Reilly and K. Whelan, April 2004.
336“The great inflation of the 1970s” by F. Collard and H. Dellas, April 2004.
337“The decline of activist stabilization policy: Natural rate misperceptions, learning and expectations” by
 A. Orphanides and J. C. Williams, April 2004.
338“The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy” by S. Athey, A. Atkeson and P. J. Kehoe, April 2004.
339“Understanding the effects of government spending on consumption” by J. Galí, J. D. López-Salido 
and J. Vallés, April 2004.
340“Indeterminacy with inflation-forecast-based rules in atwo-bloc model” by N. Batini, P. Levine
 and J. Pearlman, April 2004.
341“Benefits and spillovers of greater competition in Europe: A macroeconomic assessment” by T. Bayoumi,
 D. Laxton and P. Pesenti, April 2004.
342“Equal size, equal role? Interest rate interdependence between the euro area and the United States” by
 M. Ehrmann and M. Fratzscher, April 2004.
32
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 375
July 2004345“Optimal monetary and fiscal policy: A linear-quadratic approach” by P. Benigno and M. Woodford, April 2004.
346“Perpetual youth and endogenous labour supply: a problem and a possible solution” by G. Ascari and 
 N. Rankin, April 2004.
347“Firms’ investment decisions in response to demand and price uncertainty” by C. Fuss
 and P. Vermeulen, April 2004.
348“Financial openness and growth: Short-run gain, long-run pain?” by M. Fratzscher and M. Bussiere, April 2004.
349“Estimating the rank of the spectral density matrix” by G. Camba-Mendez and G. Kapetanios, April 2004.
350“Exchange-rate policy and the zero bound on nominal interest rates” by G. Camba-Mendez
 and G. Kapetanios, April 2004.
351“Interest rate determination in the interbank market” by V. Gaspar, G. P. Quirós and
 H. R. Mendizábal, April 2004.
352“Forecasting inflation with thick models and neural networks” by P. McNelis and 
 P. McAdam, April 2004.
343“Monetary discretion, pricing complementarity and dynamic multiple equilibria” by R. G. King
 and A. L. Wolman, April 2004.
344“Ramsey monetary policy and international relative prices” by E. Faia and T. Monacelli, April 2004.
353 “Towards the estimation of equilibrium exchange rates for CEE acceding countries: methodological
 issues and a panel cointegration perspective” by F. Maeso-Fernandez, C. Osbat and B. Schnatz, April 2004.
354 “Taking stock: monetary policy transmission to equity markets” by M. Ehrmann  and M. Fratzscher,  May 2004.
355 “Production interdependence and welfare” by K. X. D. Huang and Z. Liu, May 2004.
356 “Developing a euro area accounting matrix: issues and applications” by T. Jellema, S. Keuning,
P. McAdam and R. Mink, May 2004.
357 “Seasonal adjustment and the detection of business cycle phases” by A. M. Mir and
D. R. Osborn, May 2004.
358 “Did the pattern of aggregate employment growth change in the euro area in the
late 1990s?” by G. Mourre, May 2004.
359 “The longer term refinancing operations of the ECB” by T. Linzert, D. Nautz and U. Bindseil,
May 2004.
360 “Optimal monetary policy rules for the euro area: an analysis using the area wide model”
by A. Dieppe, K. Küster and P. McAdam, May 2004.
361 “Excess reserves and the implementation of monetary policy of the ECB” by U. Bindseil,
G. Camba-Mendez, A. Hirsch and B. Weller, May 2004.
362 “Oil price shocks and real GDP growth: empirical evidence for some OECD countries” by
R. Jiménez-Rodríguez and M. Sánchez, May 2004.
33
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 375
July 2004363 “Communication and exchange rate policy” by M. Fratzscher, May 2004.
364 “Asset price booms and monetary policy” by C. Detken and F. Smets, May 2004.
365 “Exchange rates and fundamentals: new evidence from real-time data” by M. Ehrmann and
M. Fratzscher, May 2004.
366 “The informational content of over-the-counter currency options” by P. Christoffersen and
S. Mazzotta, June 2004.
367 “Factor substitution and factor augmenting technical: progress in the US: a normalized supply-side 
system approach” by R. Klump, P. McAdam and A. Willman, June 2004.
368 “Capital quality improvement and the sources of growth in the euro area” by P. Sakellaris 
and F. W. Vijselaar, June 2004.
369 “Sovereign risk premia in the European government bond market” by K. Bernoth, J. von Hagen
and L. Schuknecht, June 2004.
370 “Inflation persistence during periods of structural change: an assessment using Greek data” 
by G. Hondroyiannis and S. Lazaretou, June 2004.
371 “Inflation persistence: facts or artefacts?” by C. R. Marques, June 2004. 
372 “The operational target of monetary policy and the rise and fall of reserve position doctrine” 
by U. Bindseil, June 2004. 
373“Technology shocks and robust sign restrictions in a euro area SVAR” by G. Peersman and 
R. Straub, July 2004. 
374 “To aggregate or not to aggregate? Euro area inflation forecasting” by N. Benalal,
J. L. Diaz del Hoyo, B. Landau, M. Roma and F. Skudelny, July 2004.
375  “Guess what: it’s the settlements!” by T. V. Koeppl and C. Monnet, July 2004.
34
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 375
July 2004